The Cost of Dishonesty: How Bad Decisions Destroy Business

Posted by Dmytro Dodenko

Introduction: Ethics as a Measurable Financial Metric

In modern business, ethical behavior is not just a “soft skill” but a critical component of financial risk management, where a failure in ethics is a direct failure in business strategy.

Unethical behavior directly increases a company’s “perceived risk.” For investors and creditors, such a business becomes less predictable and more dangerous. This heightened risk instantly transforms into a higher cost of capital: banks demand higher interest rates on loans, and shareholders expect higher returns as compensation for the risks taken. This, in turn, has a direct impact on the valuation of investment projects. A higher cost of financing means future cash flows are discounted at a higher rate, which can turn potentially profitable initiatives into loss-making ones. Thus, unethical behavior does not just create reputational problems—it stifles innovation and growth at a fundamental financial level.

The main goal of this article is to prove, using real-world examples, that unethical actions (deception, fraud, negligence) are not just “bad,” but financially unprofitable. Bad ethics will inevitably cost money, and this material will show exactly how companies pay for their mistakes.

An analysis of a series of landmark cases from Ukraine and Eastern Europe demonstrates that ignoring ethical norms and compliance standards inevitably leads to catastrophic consequences that go far beyond the initial illicit gains.

Part I: The Financial Sector: Systemic Failures and Their Global Consequences

1.1. Case Study: The Danske Bank Estonian “Laundromat”

Context

Between 2007 and 2015, the Estonian branch of Danske Bank, Denmark’s largest bank, became a central hub for suspicious transactions totaling over $230 billion¹. These funds primarily came from non-resident clients from Russia and former Soviet Union countries.

The key ethical failure was the conscious prioritization of high-risk but highly profitable clients, ignoring fundamental Anti-Money Laundering (AML) obligations¹ . This was accompanied by a systemic failure of oversight by the parent company, which failed to ensure proper control and audit¹. As early as 2014, the Estonian Financial Supervision Authority identified “large-scale, long-lasting systemic violations of anti-money laundering rules” and notified Danish authorities, but no decisive action was taken².

A key aspect of this case is that it was not merely a glitch or a mistake by individual employees, but a fundamental flaw in corporate culture and risk management systems at the group level. Internal investigations revealed that management at the Copenhagen headquarters had received, but systematically ignored, numerous warnings for years. Signals came from internal auditors, from whistleblower Howard Wilkinson (who headed the trading unit at the branch), and even from the Russian Central Bank, which warned of suspicious transactions as far back as 2007. However, the highly profitable non-resident business was considered a priority, and the associated risks were consciously downplayed.

Quantifying Direct Financial Damage (Danske Bank)

• Global Penalties: In December 2022, the bank pled guilty to fraud against U.S. banks and agreed to pay a coordinated global penalty totaling $2.06 billion¹. The breakdown of the fines was as follows:
  • U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ): $1.209 billion³.
  • U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC): $178.6 million³.
  • Danish Authorities: 4.749 billion Danish krone (approximately $670 million)³.
• Operational Losses: In 2019, the bank was forced to completely shut down its Estonian branch, leading to the total loss of this business unit and its associated revenue streams¹.

Quantifying Strategic and Reputational Damage

• Loss of Market Capitalization: During 2018, as the scale of the scandal became public knowledge, Danske Bank’s stock value halved, representing multi-billion dollar losses for shareholders².
• Criminal Conviction: Danske Bank was forced to plead guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud in the U.S.⁴. This leaves a lasting stain on the institution’s reputation, complicating its operations and relationships with correspondent banks.
• Management Repercussions: CEO Thomas Borgen was forced to resign in 2018². Although charges against him were later dropped, his career at the bank was ruined³.
• Industry-Wide Regulatory Tightening: The scandal served as a “wake-up call for the European Commission” and became a catalyst for the creation of a centralized EU Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA)¹.

1.2. Case Study: Swedbank and the Domino Effect

Context

Following the revelations at Danske Bank, an investigation by Swedish broadcaster SVT revealed that Swedbank, Sweden’s oldest bank, was also involved in processing billions of dollars in suspicious transactions through its Baltic branches⁶. The bank was linked to figures such as former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, who reportedly transferred €3.2 million to a Swedbank account in 2011⁶.

The ethical failure was twofold: first, systemic deficiencies in AML procedures, and second, the subsequent attempt by CEO Birgitte Bonnesen to actively mislead the public and investors⁷.

The Swedbank scandal is a classic example of “reputational interdependence” and the “contagion effect” in the modern financial system. It demonstrates how the unethical actions of one major player (Danske Bank) create a negative externality that “infects” other market participants, even if their own violations were smaller in scale.

Quantifying Direct Financial Damage (Swedbank)

• Regulatory Fines: Swedish and Estonian financial regulators imposed a record fine of 4 billion Swedish krona (approximately €350 million) on Swedbank for “significant deficiencies” and inadequate internal controls⁹.
• Remediation Costs: The bank was forced to allocate an additional €64 million to strengthen its financial crime fighting unit⁹.

Quantifying Strategic and Reputational Damage

• Loss of Market Capitalization: Immediately following the initial reports of the scandal, Swedbank’s share price fell by more than 20%, wiping out nearly $6 billion (€5.3 billion) of its market value⁶. During 2018–2019, the decline reached 35%¹².
• Dismissal and Imprisonment of Executives: CEO Birgitte Bonnesen was fired in March 2019⁹. In September 2024, an appeals court overturned a previous acquittal and sentenced her to 15 months in prison for “gross swindling” due to making misleading public statements¹⁵. As of October 2025, an appeal to the Supreme Court of Sweden is pending⁸.

1.3. Case Study: The Collapse and Nationalization of PrivatBank

Context

Prior to its nationalization in December 2016, PrivatBank, Ukraine’s largest commercial bank, was the subject of “massive and coordinated fraud” lasting over ten years¹⁸.

Its majority owners, Ihor Kolomoisky and Hennadiy Boholiubov, allegedly organized a scheme where funds were siphoned out of the bank via fictitious loans to shell companies¹⁹.

The fundamental ethical violation was a total betrayal of fiduciary duties. As of October 2025, Ihor Kolomoisky remains in custody in a Ukrainian pre-trial detention center, where he has been held since September 2023.

Quantifying Direct Financial Damage (PrivatBank)

• Confirmed Fraud Losses: A forensic audit conducted by the international firm Kroll confirmed that fraudulent actions led to direct losses for the bank of at least $5.5 billion¹⁸.
• Cost of State Bailout: To prevent a systemic collapse, the government was forced to nationalize the bank and inject over 193.5 billion UAH (an initial injection of 155 billion UAH followed by another 38.5 billion UAH)¹⁸. This is a direct cost to Ukrainian taxpayers, amounting to approximately 3,000 UAH per citizen¹⁸.
• Court Rulings on Recovery: In July 2025, the High Court of Justice in London found the former owners guilty of the misappropriation of nearly $2 billion¹⁹. It is expected that the final recovery amount, including interest and legal fees, will significantly exceed this figure¹⁹.

Quantifying Strategic and Reputational Damage

• Final Loss of Asset: All attempts by the former owners to challenge the nationalization in Ukrainian courts have failed. In 2024 and 2025, the Supreme Court of Ukraine issued a series of final rulings confirming that the bank cannot be returned to its former owners.
• Impact on Sovereign Risk: The Ukrainian government’s commitment not to return the bank to its former owners became a key condition of cooperation programs with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Failure to meet this condition would have threatened Ukraine with a sovereign default¹⁸.

Part II: Non-Financial Sectors: Diversity of Violations, Universality of Consequences

2.1. LPP (Retail, Poland): The Cost of Misleading the Market

Context

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Polish clothing giant LPP (owner of brands Reserved, Sinsay) announced its exit from the Russian market. However, a report by the U.S. firm Hindenburg Research in March 2024 alleged that this exit was a “sham”²⁷.

LPP strongly denied the allegations, calling them a “disinformation attack” aimed at manipulating the stock price²⁷.

Quantifying Direct Financial Damage (LPP)

• Regulatory Fine: The Polish Financial Supervision Authority (KNF) launched an investigation into LPP regarding improper disclosure of information about the sale of its Russian business. In July 2025, LPP agreed to pay a fine of 1.8 million PLN (€420,000) to settle the matter²⁷.
• Instant Market Penalty: On the day the Hindenburg report was published, LPP’s stock price plummeted by 36%, wiping out approximately €2.5 billion (11 billion PLN) of market capitalization in a single trading session²⁷.

Quantifying Strategic and Reputational Damage

• Partial Value Recovery: Despite the initial crash, LPP’s stock price subsequently partially recovered²⁷. The company emphasized that the KNF fine did not validate Hindenburg’s core allegations but only addressed technical aspects of disclosure²⁷.
• Reputational Risk: The incident set a precedent where accusations of “ESG washing” can be used to attack a company’s valuation, forcing businesses to be more transparent in their actions and reporting.

2.2. CD Projekt Red (Technology, Poland): The Cost of Unmet Expectations

Context

After the disastrous launch of Cyberpunk 2077 in 2020, which turned out to be “virtually unplayable” on previous-generation consoles, Polish developer CD Projekt Red (CDPR) faced several class-action lawsuits from investors³⁰. The main allegation was that the company misled investors regarding the technical state of the game³⁰.

Quantifying Direct Financial Damage

• Settlement: In January 2023, the lawsuits were settled for $1.85 million³⁰.

Quantifying Strategic and Reputational Damage

• “Cost of Doing Business”: For a multi-billion dollar corporation, such a settlement amount is negligible. A key condition of the agreement was that CDPR did not admit fault to any of the charges³⁰. This allowed the company to avoid a legal precedent and maintain the public narrative that the issues were unforeseen.
• Erosion of Consumer Trust: While the direct financial losses from the lawsuit were minimal, the reputational damage among gamers was immense, forcing the company to spend years and significant resources fixing the game to rebuild trust.

2.3. GetBack (Financial Services, Poland): A Debt Pyramid and Systemic Failure

Context

The collapse of the Polish debt collection company GetBack in 2018 revealed massive fraud. The company sold high-risk bonds to thousands of individual investors, including retirees, marketing them as “safe investments similar to a savings deposit”³⁵.

Investigations exposed the systematic siphoning of funds from the company and manipulation of financial information³⁷.

Quantifying Direct Financial Damage

• Investor Losses: The collapse of the scheme led to direct losses of 2.7 billion PLN (approximately €590 million) for thousands of bondholders³⁹.
• Company Collapse: The company became insolvent, leading to a total wipeout of its equity.

Quantifying Strategic and Reputational Damage

• Ongoing Criminal Proceedings: The scandal led to dozens of arrests of former board members and associated individuals³⁷. As of October 2025, investigations are ongoing, creating constant reputational pressure.
• Political Fallout and Institutional Distrust: The Supreme Audit Office of Poland (NIK) submitted a report to the prosecutor’s office accusing 21 high-ranking officials, including a former Prime Minister, of dereliction of duty. This suggests that the fraud may have been carried out under political cover, undermining trust in state institutions³⁶.

2.4. UkrBud (Construction, Ukraine): Corruption and Obstruction of Justice

Context

The UkrBud case centers on the embezzlement of state assets through a fraudulent real estate swap scheme. In 2016–2017, the company, owned by former MP Maksym Mykytas, convinced the National Guard of Ukraine to exchange 50 apartments in central Kyiv for 65 apartments on the outskirts⁴⁰.

Quantifying Direct Financial Damage

• Confirmed State Losses: A forensic examination conducted by NABU established that losses to the state amounted to 81.64 million UAH⁴⁰. Part of the losses (50 million UAH) was reimbursed to the budget⁴⁰.

Quantifying Strategic and Reputational Damage

• Unfinished Trials: The case continues to be heard in the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC)⁴². The investigation revealed that Oleg Tatarov, a lawyer for UkrBud at the time, allegedly played a key role in bribing a court expert⁴¹. Subsequently, when Tatarov became Deputy Head of the Office of the President, the case against him was transferred away from NABU, which many interpreted as obstruction of justice⁴¹.
• Reputational Risk for the State: This case illustrates the “revolving doors” between corrupt business and government authorities, causing significant damage to Ukraine’s international reputation and investment climate.

2.5. Hexi Pharma (Pharmaceuticals, Romania): A Public Health Catastrophe

Context

In 2016, it was revealed that the Romanian pharmaceutical company Hexi Pharma had been systematically diluting disinfectants supplied to hospitals for years, in some cases making them 10 times weaker than the standard. This posed an imminent threat to patient health and sparked mass public outrage⁴⁴.

Quantifying Direct Financial Damage

• Complete Business Destruction: The company was forced to close its factory and cease all operations, declaring bankruptcy⁴⁴.

Quantifying Strategic and Reputational Damage

• Total Loss of “Social License to Operate”: Public outcry and protests led to the brand and reputation being irreversibly destroyed⁴⁴.
• Severe Personal and Political Consequences: The company’s owner, Dan Condrea, died in a car crash during the investigation, which was widely suspected to be suicide. The National Minister of Health was forced to resign due to the scandal⁴⁴. The case remained without a final court verdict regarding the main figure.

2.6. Metinvest (Industry, Ukraine): ESG Risks and Stakeholder Pressure

Context

The Ukrainian industrial giant Metinvest faces dual pressure: on one hand, the need to comply with rising EU environmental standards (ESG), and on the other, accusations of past violations of environmental legislation.

Quantifying Direct Financial Damage

• Regulatory Fine: In the past, the Ilyich Iron and Steel Works of Mariupol, part of the group, paid 10 million UAH in compensation for violations in industrial waste management⁴⁷.
• Forced Capital Expenditures: In response to tightening regulatory pressure and preparation for EU standards, Metinvest significantly increased its environmental protection expenditures, which amounted to $170 million in 2024⁵⁰.

Quantifying Strategic and Reputational Damage

• Risk of “Greenwashing”: Although the company reports significant environmental investments, its own data shows that due to production growth in 2024, absolute indicators of environmental impact (emissions, water withdrawal, waste) also increased⁵⁰. This creates a reputational risk of “greenwashing”—using large investment figures to mask the actual environmental footprint.
• Scrutiny from ESG Investors: The modern investment landscape places great importance on ESG criteria⁵³. Any allegations of violations or non-transparent reporting attract close scrutiny from ESG investors and rating agencies. A potential downgrade in ESG rating could limit the company’s access to global capital and increase its cost of funding.

Conclusion: The Inevitable Impact of Unethical Behavior on the Balance Sheet

The analysis of the presented cases unequivocally confirms that unethical actions are not abstract failures, but tangible risk factors with predictable and severe financial consequences.

In the transparent, interconnected, and increasingly regulated markets of the 21st century, a solid ethical foundation is not a luxury or a public relations tool. It is a key principle of rational financial management, a prerequisite for sustainable competitiveness, and the most effective safeguard against catastrophic corporate collapse.

Table: Summary Analysis of the Consequences of Unethical Behavior

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